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FACTORS AFFECTING HUMAN CAPITAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ: 
THE ROLE OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
By Robert E. Looney* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is often arguedl that the post 1973/74 expansion in 
military expenditures in the Persia:i Gulf States has led to 
competition between the military and non-military sector~ for 
skilled labor. Furthermore, military expenditures are said to 
have pre-empted funds that might otherwise have bee:i allocat-
ed to education and the improvement of :human capital. As a 
result, military expenditures in the region tended .to frustr~te 
development plans even in the more affluent 011 exportmg 
countries. 
Certainly if this thesis is correct, Iraq, particularly fol-
lowing the outbreak of the Gulf War, should be suf~ering 
1
a 
major decline in its human capital develo?ment. Eve~ m .Iraq s 
case, however, a decline in human capital formation is not 
inevitable. In fact, previous research has shown that, at least 
in the Middle East, there tends to be a fairly close associa~ion 
between increases in military participation (number of soldiers 
per capita) and improvements in the literacy rate. Ob~ously, 
whether or not Iraqi educational and military expenditures 
complement each other or compete for scarce f~n~s. will ulti-
mately depend on the government's budgetary pnonties. 
The purpose of this paper is to address several aspects 
of the education vs. military expenditures issue as it relates to 
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Iraq. Has the country's human capital development suffered 
during the Gulf War, and if so, in what manner? Does Iraq fol-
low a pattern of military/human capital development typical to 
the Arab World? How does the country's human resource 
development during this period compare to that of Iran's? 
What are the implications of Iraq's human development pat-
terns for the country's reconstruction? 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS BEFORE THE WAR 
In the years following the nationalization of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company in 1972 and the 1973 oil prices increases, 
Iraq has made major efforts to develop its infrastructure, its oil 
sector and its goods producing sectors. Simultaneously, the 
government also worked to modernize the military. The 1975 
Algiers Accords with Iran allowed Iraq to pursue its economic 
development plans unhindered by the cost of quelling a Kur-
dish rebellion. By 1979, Iraq had displaced Iran as the second 
largest OPEC oil producer/exporter after Saudi Arabia.2 
While the Baath tradition of controlling expenditure to 
avoid debt and economic overheating was maintained until the 
end of the 1970s, it was evident by 1979 that Iraq had not 
escaped the classic structure of an oil rich retainer state. In 
addition, the government was coming under increased pres-
sure to expand expenditures following the second round of oil 
price increases in the late 1970s:3 
The government's stepped up expenditures, particularly 
after Saddam Hussain's accession to the presidency in 1979, 
placed severe strains on the economy, and many of the prob-
lems currently facing the Iraqi economy began to develop at 
this time. In particular, shortages of skilled manpower began 
to appear and bureaucratic inefficiency started to have a seri-
ous effect on the development process. 
Ironically, the over abundance of non-productive labor 
in the government service sector was matched by a serious 
labgr shortage in productive sectors. Industrial projects in the 
1976-80 Development Plan called for nearly half a million 
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additional semi-skilled workers, 375,000 craftspersons and 
1,500,000 degree holders. The total annual output of graduates 
was less than 20,000, and the situation in vocational fields was 
even more inadequate. It is impossible to say how much the 
labor bottleneck as opposed to other factors contributed to the 
shortcomings of the Plan, but abundant anecdotal evidence 
indicates it was a major factor:4 
Japanese firms working on Iraqi projects have 
had to import thousands of Chinese workers 
from the People's Republic and Yugoslav con-
struction firms have an edge in bidding on Iraqi 
projects owing to their ability to supply the nec-
essary labor. A recent World Bank study esti-
mates that by 1985 Iraq will depend on non-
Iraqis for between 4.3 and 10 percent of its 
entire labor force. The outlook may be even fur-
ther complicated if the armed forces draw more 
heavily on the limited pool of skilled labor. 5 
This last concern was realized with the mobilization of 
major segments of the labor force as the Gulf War escalated 
and size of the armed forces increased. During the early years 
of the war, the armed forces expanded from 140,000 persons in 
1978 to 450,000 in 1982, and further to 642,000 in 1984.6 
The mobilization of the military has several important 
implications. In 1978, the size of the labor force in Iraq was 
2.97 million or 24 percent of the total population of 12.41 mil-
lion. Applying the same percentage to the 1982 population of 
14.11 million yields a labor force of 3.39 million.7 This means 
that the proportion of the labor force enlisted in the army 
increased form 4. 7 percent in 1978 to 13.3 percent in 1982. By 
1984, however, with a population of 15.25 million (and an 
implied labor force of 3.66 million), it is likely that around 17.5 
percent of the labor force was in the military. 
It should be noted that the loss of a major segment of 
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than offset by the rise in the number of women in the labor 
force ~nd, more iµiportantly, by iµiported workers, mainly 
Egyptians. Thus between 1978 and 1982, the size of the labor 
force increased by 2. 7 million (from 2.97 million to 5.67 mil-
lion), while the population of Iraq increased by only 1. 7 million 
during the same period. 
Partially as a result of labor and infrastructural bottle-
necks, inflation rose, imports piled up as ports in the Gulf 
began to clog and recourse had to be made to expensive over-
land routes from Turkey and Jordan. Despite these adverse 
signs, political imperative combined with the doubling of oil 
revenues meant that the overall national growth rate in 1979 
was set at 16.8 percent, compared with average annual real 
growth of 10.5 percent in 1973. In fact, nominal growth in 1979 
was 27 percent and real growth about half that. When the war 
bro~e out in September 1980, the Iraqi economy was already 
seriously off balance, with accelerating inflation and virtually 
complete dependence on oil for export revenues. 8 
COSTS OF THE WAR 
There is no doubt that the war has profoundly distorted 
Iraq's economy, quite apart from its incalculable human cost 
which includes more than a million dead and injured and 
between 1 and 2 million displaced persons. The fact that Iraq 
has not published detailed national statistics since 1977 means 
that any attempt to estimate the cost of the war is extremely 
difficult. The difficulty is compounded because various esti-
mates each select different components or cost and thus is not 
comparable with the others. Furthermore, the estimates refer 
· to different time periods. 9 
As Joffe and McLachlan 10 note, annual costings of the 
war show similar variations. Most observers have assumed 
that in recent years Iraq has spent $4-5 billion on arms pur-
chases, with some estimates ranging as high as $6.25 billion. 
Iraq's economic losses have been estimated at around 16 billion 
a year. 
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PA'ITERNS OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
The consequences for human capital development of 
increased military expenditures in Iraq can be best assessed 
within the context of comparative developments taking place 
simultaneously in neighboring Arab countries. In fact, govern-
ment initiative in this area has expanded in recent years, with 
Arab countries as a whole increasing their educational expen-
ditures as a percent of GNP from 3.87 in 1974 to 5.08 by 1984. 
The corresponding figures for non-Arab countries were 3.33 
percent and 4.01 percent. Health expenditures-have not shown 
such a dramatic increase, however, increasing from 1.39 per-
cent of GNP in 1974 for the Arab countries to 1.59 in 1984. 
A similar pattern was observed in the non-Arab coun-
tries, where health expenditure increased form 1.32 to 1.62 
percent of GNP over the 1974-84 decade. Whereas Arab coun-
tries had a higher average annual rate of education/GNP 
growth (2.8 vs. 1.9) for the decade 1974/84, non-Arab countries 
had higher rates of expansion of per capita education expendi-
tures (12.1 vs. 10.2). 
In general, the Arab countries have experienced higher 
rates of growth of military expenditures per capita relative to 
education or health expenditures (14.5% vs. 10.2% and 11.3%) 
over the 1974/84 period. Non-Arab countries, on the other 
hand, had higher rates of per-capita growth of education and 
health expenditures relative to military expenditures (12.1 % 
and 11.5% vs. 8.8%) over the same time period. 
In short, concurrent with rapid economic growth in the 
Arab world, there has been an acceleration in military spend-
ing. For the region as a whole, military purchases have been 
partially financed by oil revenues and. by military aid. and 
grants from the major industrial country arms suppliers. 
According to Lebovic and Ishaq:ll 
Middle Eastern defense accounted for one third 
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of the military spending of developing countries 
and almost one-half of world arms imports. Dur-
ing the 1973-1982 period, the average annual 
economic growth rate for individual Middle East-
ern states was about 6.0%, while military expen-
ditures grew by approximately 13.0 percent per 
year. Although military expenditure levels vary 
greatly across countries, in a great majority of 
the countries the growth rate of military spend-
ing outpaced economic growth. This indicates a 
striking trend in the region toward higher mili-
tary burdens (military expenditures as a ratio of 
Gross Domestic Product).12 
As might be expected, comparable figures during this 
period for Iraq show that the country had a considerably high-
er increase in military expenditures than those of Arab coun-
tries as a whole; whereas Iraq's per capita military expen-
ditures were below Arab countries in 1974, $112.42 vs. 
$139.82, Iraq's per capita military expenditures increased at 
an average annual rate of 23.37% over the 1974/84 period (vs. 
14.5% for Arab countries). 
Interestingly enough, Iran's military expenditures 
increased fairly modestly during the period under considera-
tion. While increasing at an annual average rate of 14.6 during 
the 1979-84 period, they still averaged only 2.80 for the 
1974/84 period as a whole. In contrast, Iran's educational 
expenditures were considerably above those of Iraq; by 1984 
the country had a per-capita educational expenditure about 
twice that of Iraq's. 
In terms of other measures of socio-economic/military 
development, for the Arab countries: 
1. Government expenditures (as a percentage of GNP) 
on education, health and defense were about twice 
those non-Arab countries (19.1 vs. 3.2 in 1984). The rate 
of growth of the share of these expenditures in GNP 
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was also about twice as fast as those of non-Arab coun-
tries (3.8% vs. 1.9%) over the 1974/84 period. 
2. The Arab countries also have higher teacher per capi-
ta ratios than their non-Arab counterparts in the Third 
World together with higher rates of growth of this ratio 
(3.0% vs. 1.9%) over the 1974/84 period. 
3. Despite having a higher ratio of teachers per capita, 
the Arab countries have experienced, relative to non-
Arab countries, slower rates of expansion in the propor-
tion of the school age population attending school. As a 
result, the Arab countries while having a higher propor-
tion of their population in school in 1974 (42.5% vs. 
41.9%) ended the decade with a lower ratio of their 
school age population actually in school. 
4. The relative expansion of teachers in the Arab world 
resulted from this group of countries experiencing a rel-
atively rapid decline in the ratio of school age popula-
tion per teacher. 
5. Despite the relatively slow increase in the percent-
age of school age population in school, Arab countries 
were able to achieve considerably greater improvement 
in literacy than their non-Arab counterparts. 
6. Consistent with their relatively high level of military 
expenditures, Arab countries had much higher military 
participation ratios (armed forces per 1.000 population) 
than their non-Arab counterparts. In 1974 Arab coun-
tries had 11. 7% soldiers per 1,000 population, while at 
the same time non-Arab countries had 4.5%. By 1984 
the respective rates were 14.4% and 5.6%. 
Again, Iraq, while beginning the period as a relatively 
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patterns experienced by this group of states: 
l. While Iraq's expenditures on education, health and 
defense were nearly the same as the mean for the Arab 
group in 197 4, b_Y 1984 the country was spending over 
half (54.2%) of its GNP on these items, compared to 
only 22.4% for Arab countries as a group. 
2: ~im~larly, Iraq began the period with a military par-
ticipation rate slightly below (10.5% vs. 11. 7%) that of 
Arab countries, and ended it with a rate considerably 
higher (42.1%vs.14.4%). 
3. Iraq's literacy rate was slightly below that of Arab 
cou~tri~s (26.0% vs. 27.5%) in 1975. By 1984, however, 
Iraq s literacy rate had increased to 58% compared to 
48.0% for the Arab group of countries. 
4. The relati~e improvement in Iraq's literacy rate 
occurred despite the fact that the country experienced 
the same increase in school age population in school 
(2.1 % 1974/84) and school age population per teacher 
(4.9%) as the other Arab countries. 
5. In part, the improvement in literacy must have 
stei:nmed from Iraq's rapid increase in teachers per 
capita (8.4%) compared to other Arab countries (3.0%) 
over the 1974/84 period. 
6. During this period, Iran tended to have more stable 
albei~ lower expansions in most of the key ratios 
desc~1be~ above. The one exception was school age pop-
ulat10n m school, where Iran's increase was 3.4% per 
annum over the 1974/84 compared to 2.1 % for Iraq. 
. Despite Iraq's heavy commitment to the military during 
this pe · d •t · b · 
. rio , I is not o vious that the country suffered any par-
ticularly severe retardation in human capital development. As 
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Lebovic and Ishaq point13 out, besides the simple guns~ve~sus­
butter trade-off, economic theory does not unambiguously md1cate 
whether a higher military burden retards or promotes ~cono~­
ic growth in general and human cap~tal ?evelopment m parti-
cular. Empirical evidence on the subJect is the focus of ~o~tro­
versy. The classic study of the economic effects of .m1htary 
spending was done in the early 1970s by Emile Be~01t for. the 
u .S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. His findmgs 
showed that: 
There were indications of some fa'!'orable gro~h 
effects of defense expenditures on a gross basis. 
Defense manpower training creat~d ~~d 
strengthened attitudes and skills useful m civil-
ian occupations, and the defense programs pro-
vided dual use intrastructure and other goods 
and services similar to those provided by the 
civilian economy.14 
He went on to note that: 
Devoting resources to high grade civilian. invest-
ment projects rather than to defense might, of 
course, have produced even more growth. J:Iow-
ever even here the practically relevant consider-
atio~ is not the optimum alternative use of ~he 
resources but the probable actual alternative 
use. The probable actual alternative use. of _t~e 
resources absorbed by defense programs is c~v~l­
ian consumption with slight growth effects, ci:ril-
ian investment projects with widely varymg 
growth effects and non use at all-that is a 
' i5 higher rate of unemployment of resources. 
As Charles Wolf notes: 
... and paramilitary forces can contribute. to eco-
nomic development by their contributions to 
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internal and external stability. Moreover, the 
real economic costs imposed by the military on 
developing countries can be reduced to the 
extent these forces provide training, construc-
tion, technological and industrial spills-overs 
that contribute to economic growth. Evidence in 
support of both of these propositions is provided 
by the experience of several of the successfully 
modernizing countries during the past decade.16 
In a more recent study, Erich Weede finds considerable 
empirical support for the proposition that increased military 
participation rates increase overall economic growth: 
In my view, the positive effect of military service 
on economic performance should be explained as 
follows: the military teaches discipline and cre-
ates a useful habit of obeying orders. Where the 
military participation ratios are high, the mili-
tary is more likely to be disciplined and effective 
than elsewhere, since there is a perceived need 
to be on the alert against foreign enemies. More-
over, the higher the military participation ratio, 
the more young men acquire discipline and obe-
dience. That is why I regard the military 
participation ratio as a discipline related indi-
cator of human capital formation, why I suggest 
to broaden the notion of human capital forma-
tion so as to include abilities and discipline.17 
Clearly, the Arab World, given its relatively low levels of 
human capital formation, should be one of the areas most 
receptive to this link between military expenditure, military 
participation, human capital formation and economic growth. 
However, in their study of the relationship between 
defense burdens and growth in the Middle East, Lebovic and 
lshaql8 found in general the relationship was negative for the 
225 
JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD'STUDIES 
non-oil exporting countries, but that no statistically s~gnificant 
pattern existed for the total sample (seventeen co~ntnes). 
Looking at the impact of military expendit~res from ~ 
different perspective, that of labor scarcity, Cummmgs, Askari 
and Skinner, 19 note that labor shortages in the Gulf States cre-
ated by expanded military expen~tures m.ay be a far greater 
long term impediment to growth m ~he region ~ban any effects 
associated with the diversion of capital or foreign exchange to 
military activities. In a somewhat similar ma~ner~ Moham.e~ 
Raief Mousad20 found that a ten percent reduction m the mili-
tary spending ratio (percent of GN~) or a dec~ease of around 
$12.9 billion would increase education e:iu>enditure by around 
$8.1 billion per year. . 
Along these lines, Saadet Deger21 estima~ed tha~ a. 15 
percent reduction in the share of military spe~d~ng ratio i.:·• 
from 6.3% of GDP to 5.4% (approximately 13 billion dolla~s m 
absolute terms), would increase education expenditu~ ratio to 
2.93% of national output. In absolute terms,. this would 
amount to about $4.5 billion a year. These estimates were 
made for developing countries as a whole, with no distinction 
made between countries as being resource abundant or 
resource constrained, labor abundant or labor scarce and so on. 
The purpose of the analysis below is to ext~nd several 
strands of previous studies. As noted above, with several 
exceptions, previous studies have tended to co~cen:ra~e on 
developing countries as a whole. Here, we are primanly mter-
ested in examining the Arab states, a set of countries charac-
terized as generally having by Third World standards very 
high military burdens (military expenditures as a percentage 
of GNP), together with lower than average lev.el~ of human 
capital. In addition, we are interest~d in dete~mmmg whether 
and to what extent military expenditures act mdependentl~ of 
total government expenditures in affecting. human capital 
development in the region. Finally, ar~ the linkages be~ween 
military expenditures and human capital developme~t m t~e 
Arab world fundamentally different from those expenenced m 
other parts of the world, and if so why? 
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FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
The main quantifiable variables pertain to allocations 
to defense, government expenditures and the public education 
tha.t may generate human capital. The latter is proxied by the 
rat10 of public education expenditure as a proportion of GDP. 
Following D.eger,22 we as~ume that public education spending 
as a proportion of the national product is a crucial determinant 
of human capital formation (HC). In other words, if this ratio 
fal~~· then the rate of growth of human capital may, in all prob-
ability, fall too. 
As Lebovic and Ishaq have noted,23 one of the main dif-
ficulties with previous studies was their lack of clarity as to 
whether the military burden acted in some way as a statistical 
proxy for government expenditures. To avoid this problem, 
tota~ ?overnm~~t expenditures were included in the analysis in 
addition to military expenditures, with each defined in terms 
of a different ratio. Specifically, government expenditures 
(GEY) were treated in terms of their share of GNP. 
· . To avoi~ spurious correlations with government expen-
ditures, allocat10ns to defense were defined in ways other than 
the traditional military burden (military expenditures share of 
GNP). Si~~e the literature is unclear as to the most appropri-
ate defimtion of the defense burdens, three alternative mea-
sures were used: (a) military expenditures per soldier (MEAF); 
(b) the defense share of the central government budget 
<MEGE); and (c) the military participation rate-the number of 
soldiers per 1000 population (AFP). 
. ~ncrease in human capital formation over any time peri-
o~ are hkely to be affected by the level of human capital forma-
t~on at the beginning of the period, i.e., countries with a rela-
tively low level of human capital development at the beginning 
?f the period are more likely to experience pressures to 
increase their allocations to education. This process is similar 
to th: normal capital stock adjustment mechanism found to 
explain patterns of investment in physical assets i.e., invest-
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ment is likely to be higher the greater the difference between 
the actual and optimal stock of capital assets.24 To control for 
this factor, the rate of human capital development (HCo) at the 
beginning of the period (i.e., 74 for the 1974-84 interval) was 
introduced into the regression equation. 
Finally, rapid increases in per capita income may 
reduce the ratio of educational expenditures to Gross Domestic 
Product, particularly in the oil exporting countries where, due 
to absorptive capacity problems, oil revenues often outrun the 
government's capability to expand productive expenditures.25 
To achieve unbiased estimates this factor should also be con-
trolled for the share of the government budget at higher levels 
of per capita income. To control for thi~ factor, the increase in 
per capita income (YP) with the expected negative sign was 
also introduced into the regression equations. 
In sum, the model with expected signs used for examin-
ing the impact of military expenditures on human development 
was of the form:26 
HC = [GEY, MEAF, MEGE, AFP, YP, HCo] 
( +) (?) (?) (?) ( -) ( -) 
Where: 
HC = educational expenditures/GNP 
GEY = total government expenditures/GNP 
MEAF = military expenditures per soldier 
MEGE = the share of defense in the central government 
budget 
AFP = the number of soldiers per 1000 population 
YP = per capita income (GNP/population) 
HCo =educational expenditures/GNP in the base year 
All va,riables except HCo were defined in terms of their 
rate of growth over the specified time interval. To get an idea 
of the robustness of the results, step-wise regressions were 
undertaken for the entire time interval 1974-84,27 together 
with its two five-year sub-periods, 1974-79 and 1979-84. 
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RESULTS 
t 
The results for the period as a whole (197 4-84) produced 
several interesting findings: (Table 1) 
1. For developing countries, in general, increases in the 
share of government expenditures in GNP explain 
approximately 60% of the changes in human capital for-
mation. The coefficient for the government expenditure 
term (GEY) is very stable, not changing appreciably 
with varying model specification. 
2. While increased military expenditures per soldier 
(MEAF) did not detract from human capital develop-
ment, increases in the defense share of the public sector 
budget as well as increases in military expenditures per 
soldier tended to reduce the expansion of human capital 
development relative to GDP during this period. The 
same was also the case for increase in the military 
participation rate (AFP). 
3. In terms of Iraq, it appears that the country spent 
considerably less than predicted by the model, with the 
student residual for that country varying (depending on 
model specification) between -4.60 and -5.06. In other 
words, even after controlling for military expenditures 
and military participation rates, Iraq was unable, rela-
tive to most other Third World countries, to increase its 
commitment to human capital formation during this 
period. 
4. In sharp contrast, Iran's commitment to human capi-
tal formation was considerably above that anticipated 
by the model. 
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TABLE 1 
Factors Affecting Human Capital Formation 
In The Third World, 1974-1984 
(Standardized regression coefficients) 
(1) HC = 0.77 GEY 
(11.23) r2 = 0.589; F = 126.01; df = 89 
Student Residual Iraq = -4.60 Student Residual Iran = 1.56 
(2) HC = 0. 78 GEY - 0.03 MEAF 
(10.05) (-0.36) 
r2 = 0.590; F = 61.17; df = 87 
Student Residual Iraq= -4.74 Student Residual Iran= 1.52 
(3) HC = 0. 77 GEY + 0.06 MEAF - 0.2~ MEGE 
(10.86) (0.77) (-4.24) 
r2 = 0.662; F = 54.92; df = 87 
Student Residual Iraq = -5.05 Student Residual Iran = 1.38 
(4) HC = 0.74 GEY + 0.05 MEAF - 0.26 MEGE - 0.09 HCo 
(10.00) (0.65) (-3.77) (-1.34) 
r2 = 0.670; F = 42.04; df = 87 
Student Residual Iraq = -4.96 Student Residual Iran = 1.37 
(5) HC = 0.75 GEY + 0.01 MEAF - 0.25 MEGE - 0.09 HCo 
( 9.84) (0.17) (-3.58) (-1.37) 
+ 0.06 yp 
(0.77) 
r2 = 0.671; F = 33.58; df = 87 
Student Residual Iraq = -5.03 Student Residual Iran = 1.40 
(6) HC = 0.84 GEY + 0.11 MEAF - 0.17 MEGE - 0.13 HCo 
( 9.84) (-1.16) (-2.31) (-1.89) 
+ 0.10 YP - 0.20 AFP 
(l.37) (-2.62) 
r2 = 0.697; F = 31.12; df = 87 
Student Residual Iraq = -5.06 Student Residual Iran = 1.56 
Notes: HC = education expenditures/GNP; GEY = government 
expenditures/GNP; MEAF = military expenditures per soldier; 
MEGE = share of military expenditures in central government 
budget; YP = per capita income; AFP = the military participa-
tion rate (armed forces per capita). HCo = education expendi-
ture/GNP for 197 4. All variables except HCo are rates of growth. 
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Looking at countries in terms of Arab/non-Arab group-
ings (Tables 2 and 3), however, produces a picture considerably 
different than that obtained above for the Third World coun-
tries as a whole over the 197 4/84 period: 
1. While by itself the growth in the share of govern-
ment expenditures in GNP accounts for well over 65% 
of the observed fluctuations in the share of human capi-
tal formation in GDP for the Arab countries, this 
relationship breaks down with more complete model 
specification (Table 2, equations 5, 6 and 7). 
2. Perhaps more importantly, several of the military 
expenditure terms are now statistically significant. 
Both expanded rates military expenditures per soldier 
(MEAF) and the military participation rate (AFP) tend-
ed to increase human capital development during this 
time period. However, as with the total sample of Third 
World countries, increases in the defense share of the 
budget (MEGE) tended to reduce the growth in human 
capital formation. 
3. Iraq's pattern of human capital is much better 
accounted for in the context of Arab world development 
patterns than it was when the total sample of countries 
was used. While Iraq's human capital expenditures still 
expanded somewhat below the rate anticipated by the 
Arab world equations, this difference was much less than 
that predicted in the total sample case. In addition, 
Iraq's pattern of human capital development tended to 
converge toward the Arab world norm, once military 
expenditures were introduced explicitly into the model. 
4. For the non-Arab countries (Table 3) much the 
reverse was true. In addition to increased levels in 
defense expenditures in the central government budget, 
these countries as a group experienced negative impacts 
on human capital formation stemming from expanded 
military expenditures per soldier and increased military 
participation rates. 
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TABLE2 
Factors Affecting Human Capital Formation 
In The Arab World. 1974-1984 
(Standardized regression coefficients) 
(1) HC = 0.82 GEY 
(5.56) r2 = 0.659; F = 30.90; df = 17 
Student Residual Iraq = -3.01 
(2) HC = 0.54 GEY - 0.40 MEAF 
(3.07) (2.27) 
r2 = 0.746; F = 22.02; df= 17 
Student Residual Iraq = -2.52 
(3) HC = 0.48 GEY + 0.44 MEAF - 0.25 MEGE 
(2.96) (2.75) (-2.10) 
r2 = 0.867; F = 19.51; df = 17 
Student Residual Iraq = -2.50 
(4) HC = 0.32 GEY + 0.47 MEAF - 0.21 MEGE - 0.25 HCo 
(1.99) (3.20) (-1.95) (-2.01) 
r2 = 0.852; F = 30.90; df = 17 
Student Residual Iraq = -2.36 
(5) HC = 0.01 GEY + 0.91 MEAF - 0.28 MEGE - 0.27 HCo 
(0.02) (5.03) (-3.19) (-2. 76) 
- 0.41 yp 
(-3.13) 
r2 = 0.919; F = 27.16; df = 17 
Student Residual Iraq= -1.22 
(6) HC = 0.26 GEY + 1.74 MEAF - 0.49 MEGE - 0.26 HCo 
(0.02) (5.03) (-3.19) (-2. 76) 
- 0.90 YP - 0.42 AFP 
(-3.13) (2.15) 
r2 = 0.942; F = 30.21; df = 17 
Student Residual Iraq= -1.29 
(7) HC = 0.91 MEAF - 0.28 MEGE - 0.27 HCo - 0.41 YP 
(8.84) (-3.41) (-3.13) (-4.22) 
r2 = 0.918; F = 36.78; df = 17 
Student Residual Iraq = -0.65 
Notes: HC = education expenditures/GNP; GEY = government 
expenditures/GNP; MEAF = military expenditures per soldier; 
MEGE = share of military expenditures in central government 
budget; YP = per capita income; AFP = the military participa-
tion rate (armed forces per capita). HCo = education expendi-
ture/GNP for 1974. All variables except HCo are rates of growth. 
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TABLES 
Factors Affecting Human Capital Formation 
In The Non-Arab World. 1974-1984 
(Standardized regression coefficients) 
(1) HC = 0.67 GEY (7 .56) r2 = 0.449; F = 57 .12; df = 71 
Student Residual Iran = 2.4 7 
(2) HC = 0.68 GEY - 0.27 MEAF 
(43.76) (-3.19) 
r2 = 0.525; F = 37.06; df = 69 
Student Residual Iran = 2.40 
(3) HC = 0.81 GEY - 0.18 MEAF - 0.33 MEGE 
(10.00) (-2.19) (-4.10) 
r2 = 0.662; F = 36.14; df = 69 
Student Residual Iran = 2.40 
(4) HC = 0.76 GEY - 0.20 MEAF - 0.29 MEGE - 0.14 HCo 
(8.80) (-2.41) (-3.42) (-1.63) 
r2 = 0.637; F = 28.45; df = 69 
Student Residual Iran = 2.43 
(5) HC = 0.77 GEY - 0.21 MEAF - 0.29 MEGE - 0.13 HCo 
(8.25) (-2.26) (-3.37) (-1.56) 
+ 0.03YP 
(0.30) 
r2 = 0.637; F = 22.46; df = 69 
Student Residual Iran = 2.42 
(6) HC = 0.87 GEY - 0.34 MEAF - 0.21 MEGE - 0.17 HCo 
(8.89) (-3.27) (-2.41) (-2.01) 
+ 0.06 YP - 0.23 AFP 
(0.69) (-2.52) 
r2 = 0.670; F = 21.35; df = 69 
Student Residual Iran = 2.42 
Notes: HC = education expenditures/GNP; GEY - governm~nt 
expenditures/GNP; MEAF = military expenditures per soldier; 
MEGE = share of military expenditures iri central government 
budget; YP = per capita income; AFP = the military particip~­
tion rate (armed forces per capita). HCo = education expendi-
ture/GNP for 1974. All variables except HCo are rates of growth. 
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In addition to the distinctive differences observed 
between Arab and non-Arab counties, several interesting con-
trasts were found between the two five year intervals:28 
1. Other than the negative effect on human capital 
associated with increased shares of the government 
budget being allocated to defense, military expenditures 
in the developing world as a whole do not appear to 
have diverted resources away from education during 
the 1974/79 period.29 
2. During the 197 4/79 period, Iraq closely followed the 
pattern predicted by the mod~l. In this sense, its efforts 
at human capital formation were "typical" of those of 
taking place in the Third World. 
3. Iran, on the other hand, experienced rates of capital 
formation considerably above that predicted by increas-
es in government expenditures, the share of the budget 
allocated to defense and the initial (1974) share of edu-
cational expenditures in Gross Domestic Product. 
4. The patterns observed for developing countries dur-
ing 1974/79 period were quite stable (in terms of the 
size of the regression coefficients); they did not carry 
over into the 1979-84 period. Specifically, the overall 
coefficient of determination (r2) was much lower in the 
latter interval as was the strength of the expansion in 
government expenditures to increase the importance of 
education in economic activity. 
5. In addition, the military participation rate which 
was slightly significant (and negative) for the period as 
a whole was not statistically significant in either of the 
two five year sub-periods. 
6. During the 1979/84 period, Iraq's human capital 
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development was considerably below that anticipated 
by the model. In fact, the short-fall in capital formation 
from that predicted increased as the share of defense 
expenditures in the government's budget was added to 
the regression equation. 
7. On the other hand, over the 197 4/79 sub-period, Iran 
was a "typical" Third World country, following very 
closely the increase in human capital development pre-
dicted by the model. 
For Arab countries as a group: 
1. The model with government expenditures (GEY) and 
the share of defense in the government budget (MEGE) 
accounted for around 65% of the fluctuations in human 
capital formation during the 1974/79 period. 
2. In contrast to the 1974/84 period, however, increased 
rates of military expenditures per soldier were no 
longer associated with expanded levels of human capi-
tal formation. 
3. In addition, increased levels of military participation 
were associated with reductions in human capital for-
mation. 
4. During the first five year interval, Iraq closely fol-
lowed the pattern of human capital development pre-
dicted by the Arab world equations. In addition, the 
predicted value for Iraq's human capital development 
improved once the increase in military participation 
rate had been controlled for. 
5. A much different pattern emerged in the second 
(1979/84) time interval. As with the case for the 1974/85 
interval, both military expenditures per soldier and the 
military participation rate were positively associated 
with increases in human capital development. 
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6. In Iraq's case, introducing increased levels of military 
participation tended to increase considerably the level 
of human capital development predicted for that coun-
try by the model. 
Finally, in terms of the patterns of human capital 
development in the non-Arab world: 
1. In contrast to the period as a whole, military expendi-
tures per soldier (MEAF) during the 197 4-79 interval 
were not statistically significant in retarding the expan-
sion of human capital develoP.ment. 
2. Again, at this time, expanding the share of defense 
in the government budget apparently came (at least 
partially) at the expense of educational expenditures. 
3. Again Iran's performance with regard to human cap-
ital development, was superior to most developing coun-
tries. The country's positive student residual of 2.12 to 
2.22 was one of the highest in the non-Arab world dur-
ing this period. 
4. These patterns changed in the latter five year inter-
val. During this period, military expenditures per sol-
dier were now associated with reduced rates of growth 
in human capital development (the military par-
ticipation rate was statistically insignificant). 
5. For this period Iran's human capital formation was 
slightly below that for the non-Arab countries as a 
whole and its position vis a vis these countries did not 
change considerably upon controlling for military 
expenditures. 
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SUMMARY 
Tu sum up, the process of human capital development in 
the Third World appears to be affected to a certain extent by 
the pattern of military expenditures simultaneously undertak-
en by these states. The patterns vary considerably by sub-
grouping-Arab vs. non-Arab and by time period-the late 
1970s vs. the early 1980s. In general, these patterns have 
become more extreme with time. 
A major finding of the analysis above was that Arab coun-
tries have tended (particularly in the more recent times) to expe-
rience positive associations between military expenditures per 
soldier (and to a certain extent increased military participation 
rates) and human capital development. On the other hand, 
increased military expenditures per soldier (and to a lesser extent 
the military participation rate) appear to have come at the 
expense of human capital development in the non-Arab world. 
During the earlier time period, Iraq appears to have 
followed pretty closely the patterns experienced by most 
Third World countries, and certainly those of the Arab 
world. This situation deteriorated somewhat in the second 
time period, however, with Iraq missing many of the appar-
ent linkages between expanded military expenditures per 
soldier and allocations to education which existed in many 
other Arab states. On the other hand, there is some evidence 
that increased military participation during the 1979/84 
period stimulated increased rates of human capital develop-
ment in Iraq. 
As a basis comparison, Iran appears to have done rela-
tively well with regard to its human capital development, par-
ticularly during the earlier period. 
CONCLUSIONS 
While it might seem intuitively obvious that shifting 
public allocations toward military expenditures would retard 
human capital development and hence decrease a country's 
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long run growth prospects (and presumably increase its depen-
dence on foreign workers), the results presented above indicate 
that this view is too simplistic. Admittedly, this possibility may 
hold some validity for many developing countries, but it does 
not appear to be an accurate description of the process by 
which resources ar~ allocated in the Arab world. Certainly in 
recent years, increases in military expenditure per soldier (and 
perhaps also the military participation rate) appear to comple-
ment the normal allocations to education provided by most 
states. 
Based on the results presented above, one can only 
speculate as to the mechanisms linking military expenditures 
and human capital formation in the Arab world. Given short-
ages of skilled labor in Iraq,30 the government may have 
assigned a very high priority to attracting available skilled 
labor to the military services.31 
More likely, the Iraqi government has opted to subsidize 
education for increased numbers of civilians during periods of 
stepped up military expenditures with the understanding that 
upon completion of training those individuals will serve some 
time in the military. This strategy would allow the military to 
absorb the large volume of sophisticated weapons flowing into 
the country without requiring drastic increases in the numbers 
of foreign military advisors. 
This interpretation is consistent with the results 
obtained above. Given the fairly high correlation between mili-
tary expenditures and government revenues in the region,32 
allocations to both defense and education could increase fairly 
rapidly without either category experiencing significant 
changes in its share of the budget. Because of the low skill lev-
els of the local population, it is unlikely that rapid increases in 
military expenditures per soldier and in the number of soldiers 
per capita could be absorbed without accelerated training pro-
grams both within and outside of the military. 
The results presented here suggest that additional esti-
mates should be made of the impact on economic activity of 
other types of government expenditures-especially those 
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going to administration and services. It may well turn out that 
these expenditures have even higher opportunity costs in 
terms of labor shortages and/or reduced levels of educational 
attainment. 
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